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INDIVIDUAL ENFORCEMENT OF OBLIGATIONS
ARISING UNDER THE UNITED NATIONS
CHARTER
INTRODUCTION
The proper role of domestic courts in the international
legal order has been a bewildering and complex area. Conflict-
ing theoretical approaches have emerged from a comparatively
small number of cases.) Yet because of the slow development
of an international order based on the rule of law, the import-
ance of domestic litigation in the enforcement of international
legal standards cannot be overlooked.
In the United States, the failure of the Supreme Court to
supply a coherent legal framework has left to lower courts the
task of sorting through the various substantive and procedural
doctrines in an attempt to reach consistent conclusions. Promi-
nent among the procedural doctrines invoked by the courts has
been the broad concept of justiciability. Often, because of the
nature of the planitiffs' injuries or because of the nature of the
legal basis for the suit, relief has been denied on the grounds
of standing to sue. Additionally, the doctrine of self-execution
may be a bar to a suit; that is, absent additional legislative
action, an international agreement does not create enforceable
rights for individual citizens.
Recent cases among the federal appellate courts suggest a
willingness to address questions of international law once
thought to be within the exclusive domain of the executive
branch. Additionally, in the area of standing, the courts are
attempting to apply extensions of the concept developed in
recent Supreme Court decisions in a way that seriously under-
mines their traditional reliance on the doctrine of self-
execution of treaties. This comment presents a discussion of
those developments in the context of cases arising both under
the United Nations Charter and resolutions of the Security
Council. It is the author's opinion that movement toward en-
forcement of obligations created by the United Nations Charter
or Security Council Resolutions by domestic courts is a positive
step-particularly in the area of human rights.
© 1979 by Scott Lord.
1. See generally R. FALK, THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC COURTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL ORDER (1964); L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 205-24 (1972).
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THE DOCTRINE OF SELF-EXECUTION
The doctrine of self-execution springs from the Supremacy
Clause of the Constitution 2 which creates the primacy of treat-
ies over state law. The Supremacy Clause is also interpreted to
mean that treaties become the law of the land automatically,
without an implementing act of Congress. While there may
have been some doubt as to whether the Supremacy Clause was
meant to have that effect, the question was settled by Chief
Justice John Marshall's opinion in Foster v. Neilson.3
A treaty is, in its nature, a contract between two nations,
not a legislative act. It does not generally effect, of itself,
the object to be accomplished; especially, so far as its oper-
ation is infra-territorial; but is carried into execution by
the sovereign power of the respective parties to the instru-
ment. In the United States, a different principle is estab-
lished. Our constitution declares a treaty to be the law of
the land. It is, consequently, to be regarded in courts of
justice as equivalent to an act of the legislature, whenever
it operates of itself, without the aid of any legislative provi-
sion ....
But when the terms of the stipulation import a con-
tract-when either of the parties engages to perform a
particular act, the treaty addresses itself to the political,
not the judicial department; and the legislature must exe-
cute the contract, before it can become a rule for the court.'
Thus the law has stood for nearly 150 years.5
A recent Ninth Circuit case has contributed what appears
to be the most widely accepted restatement of the doctrine.
The case, People of Saipan v. United States Dep't of Interior,,
arose under the United Nations Charter and concerned the
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands.7 On January 1, 1972, the
2. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
3. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829).
4. Id. at 314.
5. See The Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 598 (1884). "[A] treaty may also
contain provisions which . . . partake of the nature of municipal law, and which are
capable of enforcement as between private parties in the courts of the country." See
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 154 (1965).
6. 502 F.2d 90 (9th Cir. 1974).
7. The islands of the Trust Territory are located in the Western
Pacific Ocean north of the Equator. There are approximately 96 island
units, variously small islands or atolls, which are scattered over an
oceanic area larger than the continent of Australia or continental United
States. The islands total land area, however, is only 687 square miles, and
only 64 are regularly inhabited.
People of Saipan v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 356 F. Supp. 645, 647 n.1 (D. Hawaii 1973).
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High Commissioner of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands
approved and later executed a lease agreement allowing Conti-
nental Airlines to construct and operate a hotel on public land
adjacent to Micro Beach, Saipan. The plaintiffs, residents of
Saipan who regularly used the beach for swimming, fishing,
and picnicking, and regarded it as one of their favorite beach
areas in Saipan,' alleged that the action violated the provisions
of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)l because no
environmental impact statement was prepared or considered
prior to the approval of the lease. The plaintiffs sought an
injunction prohibiting the implementation of the lease agree-
ment until the environmental impact of the hotel had been
studied and evaluated. 0
The district court came to the "reluctant conclusion""
that the Trust Territory government was not a federal agency
subject to judicial review under the Administrative Procedure
Act" and that the Trusteeship Agreement did not vest plain-
tiffs with individual legal rights which they might assert in
court. The court of appeals affirmed on the grounds relating to
the Administrative Procedure Act, but found the Trusteeship
Agreement self-executing.
While the court assumed without deciding that the trus-
teeship provisions of the United Nations Charter were not self-
executing, it held that the Trusteeship Agreement operated to
give the plaintiffs standing, concluding that it was "a source
of rights enforceable by an individual litigant in a domestic
court of law." 3 In considering the question of the self-execution
of the Trusteeship Agreement, the court relied on an examina-
tion of several "contextual factors," including:
[Tihe purposes of the treaty and the objectives of its crea-
tors, the existence of domestic procedures and institutions
appropriate for direct implementation, the availability
and feasibility of alternative enforcement methods, and
8. Id. at 648.
9. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4361 (Supp. 1973).
10. 356 F. Supp. at 647.
11. Id. at 648.
12. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1970). The Administrative Procedure Act, which pro-
vides for judicial review of "agency action," defines an agency as "each authority of
the Government of the United States, whether or not it is within or subject to review
by another agency .... " Id. § 701(b)(1). However, it is further provided that this
definition does not include, inter alia, "the governments of the territories or possessions
of the United States." Id. § 701(b)(1)(C).
13. 502 F.2d at 97.
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the immediate and long-range social consequences of self-
or non-self-execution."
Using these criteria, the Saipan court decided that the first
recourse of the plaintiffs should be to the High Court of the
Trust Territory. Significantly, however, the court did not ques-
tion plaintiffs' standing and regarded the earlier decision in
Diggs v. Schultz," discussed below, as firmly establishing the
right of the islanders to enforce their treaty rights in federal
court. Indeed, the court directed the High Court to reconsider
its previous opinion with regard to the non-enforceability of the
Trusteeship Agreement in light of Diggs. Finally, the federal
district court was instructed to assume jurisdiction of the case
if the High Court refused to review the acts of the High Com-
missioner.
STANDING
Before a litigant can argue the merits of his case, he must
first establish that he has standing to sue. The requirement
arises from the "cases and controversies" language in the Con-
stitution." Federal judicial authority is limited to present or
possible adverse parties, and the determination focuses on
"whether the dispute sought to be adjudicated will be pre-
sented in an adversary context and in a form historically
viewed as capable of judicial resolution."' 7
The United States Supreme Court has evolved several in-
terrelated standing requirements. The first is that of injury in
fact. This has been broadly construed to include aesthetic, en-
vironmental, recreational as well as economic injury. Nor need
it be substantial. The second requirement is that the plaintiff
be within the "zone of interests" sought to be protected by the
law in question. To this has been added the necessity that the
plaintiff allege direct injury.'" Finally, the plaintiff must show
t logical nexus between the status asserted and the claim
sought to be adjudicated, 9 but, as the court in the Diggs case
noted, "It is far from clear that this (last) formulation adds
14. Id. Discussed at text accompanying footnotes 73-79 infra.
15. 470 F.2d 461 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 931 (1973).
16. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
17. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 101 (1968).
18. Id.; Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397
U.S. 150, 152 (1969); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
19. 392 U.S. at 102.
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anything of substance to the two requirements just dis-
cussed."0
It is these twin doctrines of self-execution and standing
that have been used to determine the viability of individual
actions brought under the United Nations Charter.
INDIVIDUAL ACTIONS UNDER THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER
The status of the United Nations Charter as part of the law
of the land has been and remains a controversial question.
While it is cited with some regularity, it has rarely been used
as the rule of decision in a case, often due to the courts' use of
the doctrines of standing and self-execution. The greatest at-
tention has been focused on the Charter's human rights clauses
which, although they legally bind the United Nations member
States, have never been deemed enforceable by individuals.
Thus, any attempt to litigate under these provisions remains
problematical. As a result, few civil rights attorneys have ap-
prised themselves of the possibility of invoking them as posi-
tive law.
Nevertheless, recent developments suggest that courts'
attitude toward the Charter may be changing. To understand
the significance of the recent decisions, it is necessary to give
some background on the history of the Charter in the courts.
History of the Charter in the Courts
The first references to the Charter gave promise that the
drafters had created an instrument that would have binding
legal effect domestically as well as in the international arena.
In Hurd v. Hodge,"' a case involving racially restrictive cove-
nants, Judge Edgerton wrote an intelligent and moving dissent
to the court's decision to enforce the covenants. The dissent
cited the human rights provisions of the Charter, interpreting
them as compelling statements of public policy rather than
binding law:
The Charter of the United Nations provides that "The
United Nations shall promote . . . universal respect for,
and observance of, human rights and fundamental free-
doms for all without distinction as to race . . . and that
all Members pledge themselves to take joint and separate
action for that purpose .... America's adherence to this
20. 470 F.2d at 462 n.2.
21. 162 F.2d 233 (D.C. Cir. 1947) (Edgerton, J., dissenting).
19791
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Charter, the adherence of other countries to it, and our
American desire for international good will and coopera-
tion cannot be neglected . *..
When Hurd reached the Supreme Court 3 along with its
companion cases of Shelley v. Kraemer and McGhee v. Sipes,2"
it was reversed on fourteenth amendment grounds. In an ap-
parent reference to Judge Edgerton's Charter argument, the
Court noted that:
The power of federal courts to enforce the terms of private
agreements is at all times exercised subject to the restric-
tions and limitations of the public policy of the United
States as manifested in the Constitution, treaties, federal
statutes, and applicable legal precedents.25
The same year, the Supreme Court in Oyama v. State of
California," reversed a decision of the California Supreme
Court upholding the California Alien Land Act. 7 The law pro-
hibited aliens ineligible for American citizenship from acquir-
ing, owning, occupying, leasing or transferring agricultural
land.2" Any property acquired in violation of the statute was to
escheat as of the date of acquisition.2" Justices Murphy and
Rutledge, joining in the decision of the Court, concurred on
several distinct grounds, closing their opinion with this signifi-
cant passage:
Moreover, this nation has recently pledged itself, through
the United Nations Charter, to promote respect for, and
observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms
for all without distinction as to race, sex, language and
religion. The Alien Land Law stands as a barrier to the
fulfillment of that national pledge. Its inconsistency with
the Charter, which has been duly ratified and adopted by
the United States, is but one more reason why the statute
must be condemned.
And so in origin, purpose, administration and effect,
the Alien Land Law does violence to the high ideals of the
22. Id. at 245 (footnotes omitted).
23. 334 U.S. 24 (1948).
24. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
25. 334 U.S. 24, 34 (1948) (emphasis added).
26. 332 U.S. 633 (1948).
27. CAL. GEN. LAWS ANN. act 261, §§ 7,8 (Deering 1944 & Supp. 1945).
28. Id. §§ 1, 2. At the time the law was adopted, only free white persons and
persons of African nativity and descent were eligible for citizenship. 332 U.S. 633, 635
n.3 (1948).
29. CAL. GEN. LAWS ANN. act 261, § 7 (Deering 1944 & Supp. 1945).
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Constitution of the United States and the Charter of the
United Nations. 0
In even stronger language the Oregon Supreme Court in
Kenji Namba v. McCourt,3' followed Oyama in overturning
Oregon's Alien Land Law. The court cited the Charter in find-
ing the statute unconstitutional. "When our nation signed
the Charter of the United Nations we thereby became bound
to [those] principles. ... ,3 Unfortunately, this pronounce-
ment has been largely ignored by both Oregon courts and
others. Indeed all of the cases discussed above have received
very little recognition, at least for their references to the
Charter. The first attempts to use the Charter directly as posi-
tive law met with correspondingly meager success.
Sei Fujii
One of the most thorough of the early opinions dealing
with the Charter again concerned the California Alien Land
Law, challenged before the California Supreme Court in Sei
Fujii v. State. 33 The law was overruled in a rather far-reaching
opinion based on a fourteenth amendment equal protection
argument. The court's analysis of the effect of the Charter's
human rights clauses on the law is relevant to this discussion.
Plaintiffs contended that under the Charter, Articles 1, 55
and 56,1' the statute constituted unlawful discrimination on the
30. 332 U.S. 633, 673 (1948).
31. 185 Or. 579, 204 P.2d 569 (1949).
32. Id. at 587, 204 P.2d at 579.
33. 38 Cal. 2d 718, 242 P.2d 617 (1952).
34. Article 1 provides in part: "The purposes of the United Nations are . . . to
achieve international co-operation in . . . promoting and encouraging respect for
human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex,
language, or religion." U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 3.
Article 55 provides that:
With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which
are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on
respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples,
the United Nations shall promote:
a. higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of
economic and social progress and development;
b. solutions of international economic, social, health, and related
problems; and international cultural and educational cooperation; and
c. universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fun-
damental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language,
or religion.
U.N. CHARTER art. 55.
Article 56: "All Members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in
1979]
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basis of race. While the court accepted the contention that the
Charter is a treaty and as such is superior to state law, it ruled
that the articles in question were not self-executing and there-
fore conferred no individual rights on the plaintiffs.3 The care-
ful discussion of the Charter may have been prompted by the
unprecedented court of appeals decision which undoubtedly
led to the grant of certiorari by the high court.36 The court of
appeal eschewed any reference to specific constitutional provi-
sions, resting its decision squarely on the Charter as both a
statement of policy and a source of binding law. It went so far
as to quote the Universal Declaration of Human Rights37 as an
internationally accepted statement of the content of the term
"human rights." The appellate court therefore held that the
Alien Land Law, being in conflict with the Charter, must fall.
Its provisions that restricted rights on the basis of race and
color were found to be "untenable and unenforceable. 13 8 Unfor-
tunately, the court rested its application of the Charter on the
traditional role of the United States as a champion of human
rights, rather than on a convincing discussion of the self-
execution of the particular provisions involved. Nevertheless,
the lower court's emphasis on the public policy aspects of the
case and the social desirability of courts enforcing the non-
discrimination clauses of the Charter presaged a similar atti-
tude in People of Saipan v. Unit ed States Dep't of Interior .3
The California Supreme Court's majority opinion in Sei Fujii
concerning the self-execution of the human rights articles re-
mains, however, the generally accepted point of view in Ameri-
can courts.
Pauting v. McElroy
Pauling v. McElroy,40 a district court decision, highlighted
most of the major problems litigants face in attempting to sue
under the Charter. The action was brought by American citi-
zens, Linus Pauling among them, and non-resident aliens, in-
cooperation with the Organization for the achievement of the purpose set forth in
Article 55." U.N. CHARTER art. 56.
35. This portion of the opinion will be discussed more fully, infra.
36. See Sei Fujii v. State, 217 P.2d 481 (1950), vacated, 38 Cal. 2d 718, 242 P.2d
617 (1952).
37. Approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations, December 10,
1948. G.A. Res. 217A (III) U.N. Doc. A/811 (1948).
38. 217 P.2d at 488.
39. 502 F.2d 90 (9th Cir. 1974). See notes 73-79 and accompanying text infra.
40. 164 F. Supp. 390 (D.D.C. 1958).
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cluding several Marshall Islanders and Japanese citizens. They
sued for declaratory relief and preliminary injunctions against
the Commissioner of the Atomic Energy Commission and the
Secretary of Defense to stop nuclear testing on the atolls of
Entiewok and Bikini in the Pacific Islands Trust Territory." In
addition to claims that the tests as authorized by the Atomic
Energy Act" were unconstitutional, the Islander plaintiffs as-
serted that atomic testing threatened them with the destruc-
tion and contamination of their food supply. A similar com-
plaint had been rejected earlier by the United Nations Trustee-
ship Council on March 29, 1956.41
The court denied relief on all counts. Concerning standing,
the court held that those plaintiffs who were American citizens
did not show sufficient imminency of harm; those near enough
to the site of the tests to satisfy that requirement" were nonres-
ident aliens who did not fall under the protection of the Consti-
tution.4 5 The court dismissed the arguments based on the
United Nations Charter and the international law of the sea,
finding them non-self-executing and thus not capable of con-
ferring individually enforceable rights:
The provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, the
Trusteeship Agreement for the Trust Territory of the Pa-
cific Islands, and the international law principle of free-
dom of the seas relied on by plaintiffs are not self-
executing and do not vest any of the plaintiffs with indi-
vidual legal rights which they may assert in this Court.
41. These islands were originally German colonies administered after World War
I by Japan under a League of Nations mandate. After World War II, the Security
Council transferred them to the administration of the United States under the provi-
sions of the United Nations Charter providing for an international trusteeship system.
TRUSTEESHIP AGREEMENT FOR THE FORMER JAPANESE MANDATED ISLANDS APPROVED AT THE
ONE HUNDRED AND TWENTY-FOURTH MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, Apr. 2-July 18,
1947, 61 Stat. 3301 (1947), T.I.A.S. No. 1665 (approved by the Security Council April
2, 1947; approved by the President pursuant to a joint resolution of Congress, July 18,
1947).
42. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. § 2011 (1970).
43. 164 F. Supp. at 392.
44. Presumably, the Marshall Islanders. See id. at 393.
45. See 339 U.S. 793 (1950). But see the District of Columbia Circuit's subse-
quent "clarification" of its holding in Pauling in Constructores Civiles de Centro-
america, S.A. v. Hannah, 459 F.2d 1183, 1190 n.13 (D.C. Cir. 1972). It stated: "Citing
Johnson v. Eisentrager, [330 U.S. 793 (1950)], we have denied standing to non-
resident aliens who have not alleged specific threatened injury in challenging the
detonation of a nuclear device (citation omitted)." There have been many instances
where non-resident aliens have been allowed standing to sue in United States courts
to protect their personal or property rights. See, e.g., Disconto Gessellschaft v. Um-
breit, 208 U.S. 570 (1908).
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The claimed violations of such international obligations
and principles may be asserted only by diplomatic negotia-
tions between the sovereignties concerned."
With a final reference to the "so-called" human rights provi-
sions of the United Nations Charter,4" the court dismissed the
suit, saying that any conflict between the United Nations
Charter and the Atomic Energy Commission would have to be
resolved in the latter's favor.48
On appeal, the District of Columbia Circuit in a brief opin-
ion affirmed the district court's decision solely on the ground
of standing." The appellants, the court stated, had not alleged
a sufficiently specific injury and had instead "set themselves
up as protestants on behalf of all mankind, against the risks of
nuclear contamination in common with people generally." ' 0
The court found that there was no justiciable controversy pre-
sented, apparently because the issues raised were within the
powers of the executive and legislative branches. They con-
cluded that these were matters relating to foreign policy
"within the historic areas of political power in which the acts
of the Executive and Legislative Branches are supreme and
beyond judicial review." 5'
Three months after the lower court's decision, the United
States ceased nuclear testing and stated it would not be re-
sumed. The request for relief could have been denied on the
ground of mootness. In addition, the fact that the Trusteeship
Council had rejected the complaint previously, although hav-
ing no binding effect, lent authority to the court's decision.
These two factors probably weighed heavily in the court's deci-
sion.
46. 164 F. Supp. at 393.
47. Id.
48. Insofar as Congress has the power to abrogate obligations under the Charter,
the Court is undoubtedly correct. The legality of such derogation as a matter of inter-
national law is questionable. See L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTrrIUTION
151, 190-92 (1972). See generally Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920); Reid v.
Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
49. Pauling v. McElroy, 278 F.2d 252 (D.C. Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 835
(1960).
50. Id. at 254.
51. Id. But see L. HENKIN, supra note 29, at 214. "There is, then, no Supreme
Court precedent for extraordinary abstention from judicial review in foreign affairs
cases." Id. Such sweeping and unsupported statements as that of the court's were
undoubtedly what led Mr. Justice Brennan to lament that the political question doc-
trine has "attributes which, in various settings, diverge, combine, appear, and disap-
pear in seeming disorderliness." Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1961).
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THE HUMAN RIGHTS CLAUSES OF THE CHARTER
By briefly tracing the history of the Charter in the domes-
tic courts of the United States, it can be readily seen that
litigants have had little luck in persuading courts that its pro-
visions are self-executing. The object of the greatest hope and
the most notable failure has centered around the human rights
provisions of the Charter, primarily Articles 1, 55 and 56. No
court has followed up the early hints in Oyama, Namba and
Hurd that the human rights provisions could provide a basis
for the invalidation of discriminatory laws. Grave doubts were
cast on whether they would ever be accorded such status. The
lone exception, of course, was the California Court of Appeal
decision overruled in Sei Fujii.52 Recent developments suggest
that perhaps this court of appeal decision was rightly decided
after all, and that if the Fujii case was decided today, it would
be decided differently. 3 The time is approaching for a reconsi-
deration of the doctrine of self-execution in the context of the
human rights clause.
Self-Execution and the Human Rights Clauses: The
Arguments
The question of whether the human rights provisions
of the Charter impose binding obligations on states was
an early subject of controversy, although the weight of modem
authority indicates that this is no longer a matter of dispute."
Hans Kelsen led those who maintained that Articles 55 and 56
were non-obligatory. He found them "meaningless and redun-
dant" and concluded that Article 56 created an "empty tautol-
ogy" that urged the members to "cooperate with the Organiza-
tion to bring about cooperation among themselves."5" The ar-
guments concerning the obligatory or non-obligatory nature of
the articles focused on three main points:
52. 217 P.2d 481 (1950), vacated, 38 Cal. 2d 718 (1950).
53. See Schulter, The Domestic Status of the Human Rights Clauses of the
United Nations Charter, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 110 (1973). Note also the recent addition to
the court of Frank Newman, long-time international human rights advocate, who,
incidentally, submitted an amicus curiae brief on the Diggs side in Diggs v.
Richardson.
54. See Kunz, The United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, 43 AM. J. INT'L
L. 316 (1950); Hudson, Charter Provisions on Human Rights in American Law, 44
AM. J. INT'L L. 543 (1951); H. KELsEN, THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS (1950).
55. H. KELSEN, supra note 54, at 99-100.
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1) The meaning of the "pledge to cooperate" in Article 56;51
2) The non-intervention principle of Article 2(7) and the fail-
ure to provide for compulsory powers of the United Nations in
human rights, both bearing on the interpretation of Articles 55
and 56;11 and
3) The failure of Article 55(c) to specify particular human
rights and fundamental freedoms."
The "Pledge to Cooperate." The Fujii court in 1955 re-
garded the "pledge" language as non-binding, noting that
when the drafters wanted to impose a mandatory obligation,
for instance in Articles 104 and 105, "they employed language
which is clear and definite and manifests that intention.
' 59
Although American courts have generally followed the Fujii
court's interpretation,0 since the decision was not appealed to
the Supreme Court, the question remains unsettled for the
country as a whole."'
Those who find the articles mandatory assert that the
word pledge in its ordinary meaning denotes a solemn promise
or undertaking establishing a legal obligation," and in lieu of
the recent International Court of Justice advisory opinion, dis-
cussed below, this view appears to have been confirmed. 3 Chief
among those who found the articles obligatory was Hersch Lau-
terpacht. He felt that the view of Kelsen and others that the
articles were merely a declaration of principles was "no more
than a facile generalization." He stated:
There is a distinct element of legal duty in the undertaking
expressed in Article 56 in which "All Members pledge
themselves to take joint and separate action in cooperation
with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes
set forth in Article 55." The cumulative legal result of all
these pronouncements cannot be ignored . . . . Any con-
struction of the Charter according to which Members of
the United Nations are, in law, entitled to disregard-and
56. Id.
57. Id.: Kemp v. Rubin, 188 Misc. 310, 69 N.Y.S.2d 680, 686 (1947).
58. H. KELSEN, supra note 54, at 100.
59. Sei Fujii v. State, 38 Cal. 2d at 723, 242 P.2d at 621.
60. See notes 33-39 and accompanying text supra.
61. See Finch, The Need to Restrain the Treaty-Making Power of the United
States Within Constitutional Limits, 48 AM. J. INT'L L. 57, 72 (1954).
62. The French text reads: "Les membres s'engagent ... a agir."
63. Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences for States of the Continued
Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security
Council Resolution 276 (1970), [19711 I.C.J. 16.
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to violate-human rights and fundamental freedoms is
destructive of both the legal and the moral authority of the
Charter as a whole. 4
This view was given significant support by the Interna-
tional Court of Justice in its Advisory Opinion on the Legal
Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South
Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Secu-
rity Council Resolution 276 (1970) (hereinafter Namibia
Opinion)."5 The court gave a lengthy consideration to the volu-
minous materials introduced by the member nations. Among
these was a written statement submitted by the United States.
It was directly supportive of the court's final opinion. In a
discussion of South Africa's presence in Namibia and its conse-
quences, the statement provided that, "[in accordance with
Chapter IX of the Charter (Articles 55 and 56), States have an
obligation to cooperate with the United Nations towards the
realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms, with-
out discrimination, for the people of Namibia,"" apparently
referring to a present obligation, not a contract to take action
in the future.
In paragraph 131 of the Court's decision, this view was
affirmed and expanded:
Under the Charter of the United Nations, the former Man-
datory had pledged itself to observe and respect, in a terri-
tory having an international status, human rights and fun-
damental freedoms for all without distinction as to race.
To establish instead, and to enforce, distinctions, exclu-
sions, restrictions and limitations exclusively based on
grounds of race, color, descent or national or ethnic origin
which constitute a denial of fundamental human rights is
a flagrant violation of the purposes and principles of the
Charter. 7
64. H. LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 148-49 (1950).
65. [19711 I.C.J. 16.
66. Written Statement of the United States of America, Advisory Opinion on the
Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia
(South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), I.C.J.
Pleadings 843, 883 (1971). See also the statements of the then Secretary of State
William P. Rogers that: "We oppose [South Africa's] continued administration of
Namibia . . . and their implementation of apartheid and other repressive legislation
there." U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, BULL. No. 521 (1970).
67. [19711 I.C.J. 16, 45. See also Commission on the Status of Women, Interna-
tional Instruments and National Standards Relating to the Status of Women, Report
of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. E/CN.6/552 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Report
of the Secretary-General]. "However, the proposition that one aspect of the human
rights question is sufficiently defined in the Charter, namely, the prohibition of dis-
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Thus, the International Court of Justice presently regards
the Charter human rights provisions as creating present, bind-
ing obligations-a position supported by the United States
Government.
The Application of Article 2(7). Article 2(7) of the Charter
provides:
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize
the United Nations to intervene in matters which are es-
sentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or
shall require the Members to submit such matters to set-
tlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall
not prejudice the application of enforcement measures
under Chapter VII.
The by now well-worn argument that this article of the
Charter prevents any consideration of a state's policies con-
cerning the human rights of its citizens has been sufficiently
discredited so as to need little discussion.6" State practice as
well as the practice of the organs of the United Nations particu-
larly support the view that human rights is a matter of interna-
tional concern." In any case, Article 2(7) forbids only United
Nations intervention and speaks not at all to the question of
obligations assumed as individual states, pledging to take sep-
arate action. It can hardly be claimed that requiring a member
to live up to a voluntarily assumed obligation, such as demand-
ing compliance with Articles 55 and 56, constitutes unlawful
intervention.
The Specific Obligation Assumed Under Article 55(c). The
final claim of those opposing the application of the human
rights articles as obligatory is that their provisions are too
vague for enforcement. This, indeed, was the argument of the
Fujii court in denying that the provisions are capable of being
considered self-executing. Yet the plain meaning of the terms
seems abundantly clear, at least for purposes of judicial en-
forcement. To maintain that the words "achievement of re-
spect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental
tinctions made in the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms on the
grounds of race, sex, language or religion, has never been contested." Id. at 8.
68. See generally L. SOHN & T. BUENGENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF
HUMAN RIc.HTS passim (1973) (various discussions of Art. 2(7)); Watson,
Autointerpretation Competence, and the Continuing Validity of Article 2(7) of the
UN. Charter, 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 60 (1977).
69. Notable is the Soviet Union's championing of the cause of humanitarian
intervention in the 1971 Bangladesh conflict. See, e.g., Franck & Rodley, The Law, the
United Nations and Bangladesh, 2 ISRAEL Y.B. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 142 (1972).
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freedoms"70 are vague and unenforceable is to deny the fact
that legal phrases gain their force and substance from the en-
tire web of experience which produced them. Although at one
time "human rights" may have been an ambiguous phrase, the
present international consensus on its substantive content can-
not be ignored or denied. The Universal Declaration of Human
Rights,7' the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights,7" and the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights73 evidence an unprecedented international
consensus on the meaning of the concept of human rights. At
the very least, the fact that the articles prohibit distinctions
made in the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental free-
doms on the grounds of race, sex, language or religion has never
been questioned." In view of the foregoing, it seems that the
Fujii determination of the non-self-executing status of Articles
55 and 56 is ripe for overruling.75
Self-Execution and the Human Rights Clauses: Reapply-
ing the Saipan Criteria. As noted above, the Saipan test for
self-execution is the definitive modern statement of the doc-
trine. Keeping in mind that this test was an elaboration of
secondary criteria, to be considered in the event of ambiguity,
it is necessary to look .at the primary criteria of the purpose of
the clauses and the objectives of its creators. To determine
these, it is not necessary to go beyond Article 1 of the Charter's
statement of the purposes and objectives of the United Na-
tions, which provides, inter alia, that its aim is to achieve
international cooperation, to promote and encourage respect
for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without
distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion." Especially
significant also is the statement in the Preamble regarding the
determination of the drafters to "establish conditions under
which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treat-
ies and other sources of international law can be maintained."77
The latter statement appears to be an invitation for the mem-
bers to begin promoting the enforcement of international legal
70. U.N. CHARTER, art. 55, para. (c).
71. Universal Declaration, supra note 37.
72. 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
73. 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
74. Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations and Equal Protection
Law, supra note 67, at 8.
75. See Schulter, supra note 53, at 62 n.291.
*76. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 3.
77. U.N. CHARTER, preamble.
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norms in their domestic courts. A logical place to begin would
be with the Charter itself.
The second step is to determine the existence of domestic
institutions appropriate for direct implementation of require-
ments of the clause in question. The Saipan court further elab-
orated this criterion in deciding that finding the Trusteeship
Agreement self-executing would require "little legal or admin-
istrative innovation in the domestic flora.""
As a counterpoise to this test, the court suggested its third
factor, the determination of the existence of an alternative
forum, finding in that case that "the alternative forum, the
Security Council, would present to the plaintiffs obstacles so
great as to make their rights virtually unenforceable."7 The
court seemed to be proposing a balancing test. How significant
it intended the lack of an alternative forum to be, however, is
unclear.
It is not clear, for example, whether a court is obligated to
hear a case if the plaintiff can show that he will be left without
a forum. Succeeding courts have not read Saipan in that way.
In Diggs v. Richardson,"0 the District of Columbia Circuit
Court of Appeals purportedly applied the Saipan criteria in a
case involving the attempted enforcement of a United Nations
Security Council Resolution, calling upon
[AIll states . . . to abstain from sending diplomatic or
special missions to South Africa that includes the Terri-.
tory of Namibia in their jurisdiction. . . [and] to abstain
from entering into economic and other forms of relation-
ship or dealings with South Africa on behalf of or concern-
ing Namibia which may entrench its authority over the
Territory.'
The court found that the Resolution was "not addressed to the
judicial branch of our government" and did not "confer rights
on individual citizens." 2 Yet the court recognized that the
plaintiffs had judicially cognizable injuries by affirming the
78. 502 F.2d at 97.
79. Id.
80. 555 F.2d 848 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
81. 26 U.N. SCOR (1598th mtg.) 7, U.N. Doc. S/INF/27 at 7-8 (1971). Security
Council Resolution 301 reaffirmed earlier U.N. Security Council resolutions, calling on
member states to refrain from dealing with South Africa, which were inconsistent with
the declared illegality of the South African control of Namibia. See Security Council
Resolution 283, 25 U.N. SCOR (1550th mtg.) 2, U.N. Doc. S/INF/25 at 2-3 (1970);
Security Council Resolution 276, 25 U.N. SCOR (1550th mtg.) 1, U.N. Doc. S/INF/25
at 1-2 (1970).
82. 555 F.2d at 851.
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district court's finding that they had standing to sue. This
presented the anomaly of an injury which the courts would
recognize but not redress, even while realizing that the only
alternative forum would be the Security Council.
The ability of the domestic judicial system to implement
the human rights articles presents little difficulty. Essentially,
the clauses would require that the human rights granted by the
state be administered without discrimination. The substantive
contents of those rights could be determined by looking to those
rights already granted through the Constitution and federal
statutes. Indeed, the latter could be regarded as executing the
clauses if need be. In that way, the courts could be performing
their dual function as agents of both the domestic and the
international legal orders and of ensuring respect for our inter-
national obligations.
The fourth standard in the Saipan test, that of determin-
ing the immediate and long-range social consequences of self-
execution is extremely ambiguous as an analytical tool. Indeed,
the Saipan court itself made no attempt to utilize it. Arguably,
the fact that those in government empowered with making
international agreements under the Constitution have done so
and approved such an agreement makes the question of its
desirability and its social consequences moot. The inclusion of
such a broad and ill-defined test will undoubtedly prove trou-
blesome to those in search of guidance on the question of self-
execution, and it appears to add little to the other three cri-
teria.
The immediate and long-range social consequences of the
self-execution of the human rights clauses have been indi-
cated. 3 Their application would work no radical change on the
rights of citizens as now enforced nor would they have a deleter-
ious effect on rights. The positive effects of enforcing obliga-
tions under the Charter could only increase respect for the
United States abroad. In summary, there appear ample rea-
sons for, and little against, a domestic court's finding the
human rights clauses of the Charter self-executing. Although
the courts have not accepted that argument directly, recent
cases suggest a slightly changing attitude.
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS CONCERNING THE RELATION OF STANDING
AND SELF-EXECUTION
A discussion of Diggs v. Schultz 4 and Diggs v.
83. See notes 69-73 and accompanying text supra.
84. 470 F.2d 461 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 931 (1973).
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Richardson" is included to illustrate the recent blurring of the
former distinctions between the doctrines of standing and self-
execution. Schultz and Richardson, rather than being brought
under the Charter directly, were brought under Security Coun-
cil Resolutions. In Article 25, member nations agree "to accept
and carry out the decisions of the Security Council.""s This
requirement is generally read as applying only to those resolu-
tions based on Chapter VII of the Charter, i.e. made in response
to a threat to the peace or an actual breach of it." Such resolu-
tions thus constitute valid international agreements, and liti-
gants face the same difficulties in maintaining their suits-as-
serting sufficient standing and demonstrating the self-
execution of the resolution in question.
Diggs v. Schultz
Diggs v. Schultz. was a suit instituted by Representative
Diggs of Michigan, and a number of others,"8 seeking declara-
tory and injunctive relief against presidential authorization of
the importation of metallurgical chromite from Southern Rho-
desia pursuant to the Byrd Amendment 9 to the Strategic and
85. 555 F.2d 848 (D.C. Cir. 1976). Recently, in actions relying on Art. 2(7),
litigants have attempted to invoke the Charter to overturn the Ker-Frisbie rule that
the forcible abduction of a defendant from another country or state does not prevent
a court from asserting jurisdiction. See United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267 (2d
Cir.i, motion for rehearing denied, 504 F.2d 1380 (2d Cir. 1974); United States ex. rel.
Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1001 (1975); United
States v. Lira, 515 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 847 (1975). For a discussion
of these cases, see Sarsody, Jurisdiction Following Illegal Extraterritorial Seizure:
International Human Rights Obligations as an Alternative to Constitutional
Stalemate, 54 TEX. L. REV. 1439 (1976).
86. U.N. CHARTER art. 25.
87. L. SOHN & T. BUENGENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 475
(1973).
88. The plaintiffs determined to have standing were M'Gabe and Zimba'bive,
who were unable to return to their homeland; Diggs, Conyers, Rangel, Stokes and
Franck, who had been denied entry into Southern Rhodesia; the American Commit-
tee on Africa, whose chairman had been denied entry; the Council for Christian
Social Action of the United Church of Christ, whose missionaries had been arrested
and deported from Southern Rhodesia; and Gore Vidal, an author, who had the sale
of one of his books banned in Southern Rhodesia.
89. 50 U.S.C. § 98h-1 (Supp. V 1975) (amending 50 U.S.C. §§ 98-98h (1946))
provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, on and after January 1, 1972,
the President may not prohibit or regulate the importation into the
United States of any material determined to be strategic and critical
pursuant to the provisions of this Act, if such material is the product of
any foreign country or area not listed as a Communist-dominated country
or area in general headnote 3(d) of the Tariff Schedules of the United
States (section 1202 of Title 19), for so long as the importation into the
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Critical Materials Stock Piling Act in violation of the United
Nations embargo"1 of that country. The district court granted
defendant's motion to dismiss based on plaintiffs' lack of
standing and non-justiciability of the issues raised. On appeal,
the court affirmed the decision on the latter ground, although,
in a significant advance, it determined that the plaintiffs did
have standing to raise the issue.2
The court had no problem in finding the injury in fact for
most of the named plaintiffs. 3 In all but one instance the inju-
ries were non-economic, i.e., the limitation on the right to
travel in Rhodesia. While this would seem to be part of the
exercise of that country's legitimate sovereign rights, the court
felt that the exclusions were invidious and discriminatory.
Without a discussion of the Resolution's self-execution, the
court stated that the plaintiffs' legitimate quarrel was with the
United States government. It was the American government's
violation of the embargo imposed by Security Council Resolu-
tion which led to the plaintiffs' injuries. The Resolution had
been promulgated in an attempt to terminate the policies of
the Southern Rhodesian government which had given rise to
the plaintiffs' wrong. The illegal action of the United States in
flouting the embargo tended to deprive the plaintiffs of poten-
tial benefits.
Although the district court found this nexus tenuous, the
appellate court, using a test similar to the alternative means
of enforcement test later promulgated in Saipan,9 responded
vigorously, stating that such a view:
strikes us as tantamount to saying that because the per-
formance of the United Nations is not always equal to its
promise, the commitments of a member may be disre-
garded without having to respond in court to a charge of
treaty violation. It may be that the particular economic
sanctions invoked against Southern Rhodesia in this in-
stance will fall short of their goal, and that appellants will
ultimately reap no benefit from them. But, to persons situ-
ated as are appellants, United Nations action constitutes
United States of material of that kind which is the product of such
Communist-dominated countries or areas is not prohibited by any provi-
sions of law.
90. 50 U.S.C. §§ 98-98h-1 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
91. Resolution 232, 21 U.N. SCOR (1340th mtg.) 1, U.N. Doc. S/INF/21/rev. 1,
at 7-9 (1966).
92. 470 F.2d at 464-65.
93. See note 77 supra.
94. See notes 41-42 and accompanying text supra.
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the only hope; and they are personally aggrieved and in-
jured by the dereliction of any member state which weak-
ens the capacity of the world organization to make its poli-
cies meaningful. ",
While far-reaching, this finding is not without support in
the decisions of the, Supreme Court. For instance, in
Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v.
Camp, "1 the plaintiffs challenged a ruling of the Comptroller of
the Currency that would have allowed banks to sell data pro-
cessing services. They alleged that such a ruling was contrary
to the banking statutes,97 and contended they would be injured
by the increased competition. The Court found this injury suf-
ficient, and held that the statute protected their interests. Yet
it is clear that it was not the agency's activities that would
inflict the direct injury on the plaintiffs, but the activity of the
banks, that is, of third parties. Thus the injury need not spring
directly from the actions of the agency being sued.
In assuming the validity of the Security Council Resolu-
tion as a basis of a legal right, the Diggs court seemed to find
it the equivalent of a treaty. Yet it is unlikely that such an
unprecedented step would be taken without an explicit and
careful analysis. Indeed, the court's failure to grapple with the
issue was entirely consistent with the Data approach which
requires only that the resolution be arguably equivalent to a
statute. The question of the legal rights, if any, created by the
Resolution was an issue to be raised in a trial on the merits,
The Diggs decision has potentially two areas of innovative
effect. The first is in its expansion in the concept of standing
in the federal courts. The second is in increasing the likelihood
that international organizations may promulgate resolutions
which may be relied on in domestic courts to challenge the
actions of administrative agencies.
Diggs v. Richardson
In Diggs v. Richardson," decided four years after Diggs v.
Schultz, again by the District of Columbia Circuit, many of the
same issues were raised, and the approach developed in the
95. 470 F.2d at 465.
96. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
97. "No bank service corporation may engage in any activity other than the
performance of bank services for banks." Bank Services Corporation Act, 12 U.S.C. §
1864 (1970).
98. 555 F.2d 848 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
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earlier case was applied. The violation of Security Council Res-
olution 3010 occurred in the context of an inspection visit by
Department of Commerce officials authorized under the Mar-
ine Mammal Protection Act of 197200 for the purpose of deter-
mining if its requirements for the harvesting of fur seals for
importation into this country were met. To prevent further
visits, plaintiffs'0' sought injunctive and declaratory relief.
The standing of the plaintiffs to bring the suit was placed
in question and, in view of the narrowing of the concept which
took place between the Schultz case and this one,0 2 the court's
decision to uphold it was important. The asserted injuries were
indeed so similar to Schultz that the court spent little time in
discussing it and moved instead to the question of the legal
right the plaintiffs sought to assert, that is, the self-execution
of the Resolution.
The court affirmed the district court's opinion'03 that the
Resolution in question did not confer rights upon the citizens
of the United States that are enforceable in court in the ab-
sence of implementing legislation. After an obligatory nod to
the Foster v. Neilson test and the Head Money Cases,"" the
court relied on the Saipan criteria'05 to come to its decision.
99. See note 75 supra.
100. 16 U.S.C. § 1361 (1976).
101. The plaintiffs were: 1) Charles Diggs, Jr., Chairman of the House Sub-
Committee on Africa; 2) George Houser, Executive Director of the American Commit-
tee on Africa; 3) Southwest Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), an association of
inhabitants of Namibia and persons who have come from Namibia; and 4) Theo-Ben
Gurirab, a member of SWAPO and its unrecognized "representative plenipotentiary
to the United Nations and to the Americas," a refugee from Namibia who does not
return there since he would be subject to arrest by the government of South Africa.
Plaintiffs Diggs and Houser have been denied entry into the territory of Namibia.
SWAPO brought suit on behalf of itself and its members, many of whom are prevented
from returning to Namibia.
102. See Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26
(1976); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974); Schlesinger v. Reservists to
Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975). Over the last
few years, the Supreme Court has grown increasingly strict in applying its requirement
that cases present actual controversies. The new formulation of that principle states
that indirectness of injury is not necessarily fatal to standing, "[lit may make it
substantially more difficult to meet the minimum requirements. . . to establish that,
in fact, the asserted injury was the consequence of the defendant's actions, or that the
prospective relief will remove the harm." Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 505 (1973).
Plaintiffs are required to show a sufficient personal stake in the outcome of the contro-
versy, and to show a non-speculative relation of their injury to the challenged actions
of the defendants in order to be granted standing.
103. Diggs v. Dent, No. 74-1292 (D.D.C., filed May 14, 1975), aff'd sub nom.
Diggs v. Richardson, 555 F.2d 848 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
104. 112 U.S. 589 (1884).
105. See notes 42-43 and accompanying text supra.
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Unfortunately, the court gave only slight indications of how
those criteria applied to the Resolution and relied mainly on an
unarticulated admixture of the doctrines of self-execution and
political question. Thus, while it affirmed the right of standing
recognized in Schultz and Saipan, the court's pronouncements
on self-execution and political question, especially in view of
repeated government acknowledgments of the obligatory na-
ture of the Resolution, 00 served to further confuse the already
murky issue of justiciability.
Conclusion
It has been the purpose of this comment to trace the Iiis-
tory of the Charter in United States courts insofar as it has
operated to grant plaintiffs standing to sue.under it and to
analyze its application under the related but analytically dis-
tinct concept of self-execution. The foothold gained in the two
Diggs cases and the Saipan case appears to be firmly estab-
lished and presages well for the future of our courts as forums
increasingly more aware of their obligation to realize that viola-
tions of international law are not merely political matters to be
settled through diplomatic channels by the states involved, but
are also worthy of redress by injured individuals in the domes-
tic courts.
Scott Lord
106. Plaintiffs cited a letter from Deputy Secretary of State Robert S. Ingersoll
to Secretary of Commerce Frederick B. Dent, in which Ingersoll stated: "We do not
believe that an official visit to Namibia by Commerce Department employees or con-
tract personnel, and a possible determination by you regarding South Africa's manage-
ment of Namibian marine mammal resources can be brought into conformity with...
the obligations [set forth in Security Council Resolution 301]." Letter from Deputy
Secretary of State Robert S. Ingersoll to Secretary of Commerce Frederick B. Dent
(Aug. 2, 1974).
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